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Is Organ Reanimation 
a Better Mousetrap? 
Presented at LL U Ethics Grand Rounds on January 10, 1996 
Robert D. Orr, MD 
The major successes of transplantation using organs from 
donors declared dead by neurological criteria have resulted 
in a situation where the demand for replacement organs seri-
ously outstrips the supply from voluntary organ donation. 
Each month the waiting list of potential recipients grows, 
and each day patients die because no organs are available for 
them. Proposals and efforts have been made to increase the 
supply of organs by changing the procurement system or by 
expanding the number and type of donors. 
Changing the procurement system 
The federal government has instituted "required 
request,'" in that hospitals may not forego asking families of 
potential donors if they are willing to consent, but this has 
not appreciably increased the organ supply. Some countries 
in Europe and South America have instituted policies of 
"presumed consent"Z in that any dead person is a donor 
unless he or she has specifically declined beforehand, and 
this has had some positive impact. An alternative which 
might be more acceptable in the individualistic North 
American scene is "mandated choice"3 which would require 
each adult to make a decision for or against donation, most 
likely on his or her driver's license. In some other countries, 
donors can be paid for non-vital organs, but this remains 
strictly illegal in the U.S. There are also proposals to offer 
monetary incentives to families who give consent or to med-
ical professionals who are able to secure the consent. 
Expanding the number and type of donors 
Live donors have been used (related and non-related 
adults, occasionally children) for non-vital organ donation. 
Live-born infants with anencephaly have been proposed as 
"donors" of vital organs, and animal organs have also been 
used experimentally. Prisoners facing execution have occa-
sionally volunteered to be donors, but their organs have not 
been used for several reasons. Non-heart-beating-cadaver 
donors (NHBCO's) are another possibility. 
Technical and ethical concerns 
Whatever method is used, and from whomever organs 
are to be retrieved, we must be aware of the technical 
obstacles and ethical concerns surrounding organ retrieval 
and donation. Technically, the problems involve the deter-
mination of death (the concept, definition, and specific cri-
On the last page of this issue: 
Register for the February 
Conference 
teria) and the deterioration of organs which happens when 
they remain at body temperature without any circulation 
(the warm ischemia time). The ethical concerns include 
continuation of humane and dignified care for dying 
patients and compassionate care for their families. It is also 
considered important not to compromise the care of the per-
son who is dying for the benefit of a potential recipient, and 
to treat the newly dead body with respect. 
Non-heart-beating-cadaver donors 
It is dogma that we do not retrieve vital organs for trans-
plantation from individuals before 
preservation solution is then instituted to reduce the warm 
ischemia time. This perfusion may be continued for sev-
eral hours before organ retrieval is accomplished. It was 
initially proposed that consent for the retrieval would be 
obtained before perfusion was begun. This would have 
met few, if any, ethical objections. However, major logisti-
cal problems of obtaining consent within the few minutes 
available immediately after death made it impossible to 
retrieve organs in this fashion. An alternative proposed by 
the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois was to begin cold per-
fusion without consent in order to preserve for the family 
the option of donation, which could then be discussed dur-
ing the next few hours. 
they are dead. Most organs used in 
transplantation today are taken from 
individuals who are declared dead 
using neurological criteria, because 
the vital organs can be preserved by 
continued perfusion until the proper 
HThis proposal would allow the 
patient's family to remain with the 
patient during the dying process." 
This proposal raises several 
ethical objections. The objec-
tion which is most unique in this 
clinical situation is the use of a 
non-therapeutic invasive proce-
time for retrieval; i.e., the heart-beating cadaver is contin-
ued on organ support (not "life support"). However, when 
transplantation was first introduced in the 1960s, neurologi-
cal criteria had not yet been developed and organs were 
retrieved from cadavers after declaration of death by stan-
dard cardiopulmonary criteria, i.e. non-heart-beating cadav-
ers. There has been recent interest in reviewing this poten-
tial source of organs. Several proposals have been intro-
duced to do this, but some of them raise concerns about dis-
tortion of the technical matters, and some ignore the ethical 
concerns mentioned above. 
In situ cold perfusion has been proposed as a way to 
retrieve solid organs from NHBCO's after sudden, unex-
pected death, usually in the emergency room.4 In this pro-
posal, death is declared using standard cardiopulmonary cri-
teria. Intravascular and intraperitoneal perfusion of cold 
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dure without consent. Many 
believe this constitutes disrespectful treatment of a recent-
ly dead body. This same objection has been raised in rela-
tion to dissection of human corpses by medical students 
and post-mortem autopsy to determine the cause of death. 
These procedures have come to be generally acceptable in 
most cultural settings since it is felt that the potential ben-
efit to others out-weighs the potential disrespect to the 
deceased. Practicing endotracheal intubation on recently 
dead patients, although not disfiguring, continues to be 
discomfiting to some and an item of ethical discussion. 
When in situ cold perfusion is done prior to obtaining 
consent, the consent process may still be somewhat hurried 
for the acutely grieving family, though perhaps no more so 
than in many instances of retrieval from heart-beating 
cadaver donors. This proposal also raises the question of 
whether the members of the family of the deceased will be 
informed of the cold perfusion if they decline organ dona-
tion. In addition, the rapid transition from life-saving ther-
apy to organ preservation could entail significant conflict of 
interest for medical professionals. This obstacle has been 
adequately addressed in other proposals for organ procure-
ment, which clearly delineate and separate the functions of 
caring for the dying patient and organ retrieval. 
It is also uncertain what affect this proposal would have 
on public acceptance of organ donation. It is not unrea-
sonable to expect, however, that public awareness of cold 
perfusion without consent could lead to a perception of 
unethical behavior on the part of the procurement team, 
and this might decrease the willingness of some to be organ 
donors. 
Controlled death 
In some situations, the time and place of death may be 
controlled in such a manner as to minimize warm ischemia 
and optimize conditions for organ retrieval, for example, 
after a decision has been made by the patient or family to 
withdraw life support with the expectation that the patient 
will die. Unhurried consent may be obtained between the 
time of the decision to withdraw treatment and the actual 
implementation of that decision. 
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A protocol to retrieve organs in such situations has 
been instituted in Pittsburgh.5 At the appropriate time, 
the patient is moved to the operating room and is 
.,- prepped and draped for surgery . . Life support is dis-
) co~tinued with the orga.n retri.eval team waiting in. an 
. adjacent room. Death IS awaIted and declared usmg 
newly developed cardiac criteria, and the organs are 
retrieved. This proposal was developed methodically 
over a period of four years with extensive internal and 
external review. It is quite conservative regarding 
issues of consent, conflicts of interest, documentation, 
and review of the decisions. It departs dramatically 
from medical tradition, however, in its drastic redefini-
tion of death as "two minutes of pulselessness" which 
may include asystole, ventricular fibrillation, or electro-
mechanical disassociation. These new criteria for death 
have been called "gerrymandering,"6 "policy creep,"7 
and "an ignoble form of cannibalism."8 It has been 
pointed out that the hearts retrieved in this manner do 
not meet the irreversibility criteria of the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act (UDDA). For instance, 
these cardiac criteria for death would not be used or 
acceptable if applied to the potential recipient; heroic 
efforts would likely be used to resuscitate a patient 
awaiting an organ if he or she demonstrated ventricular 
fibrillation. Defenders of the protocol insist that these 
criteria were developed because of the exceedingly low 
probability of auto resuscitation, however, this defense 
has been criticized because little empiric data is offered 
to support their contention. 
In addition to this major departure from accepted 
medical standards, the proposal involves separation of 
the family from the patient during the dying process 
and immediately after death. It also raises the difficul-
ty of predicting the time of death, so both family and 
procurement team may have a protracted wait while 
separated from the patient, and occasionally patients 
survive such withdrawal of life support. Again, the 
effect on public acceptance of organ donation is 
unknown, but it is not unreasonable to expect that per-
sons unfamiliar with the details of or reasoning behind 
the procedure would perceive this hurried retrieval as 
very discomfiting. 
Reanimation is an alternative method of organ 
retrieval which has been performed successfully in 
lambs and baboons here at Lorna Linda. After being 
anesthetized, paralyzed, and extubated, the donor ani-
mals demonstrated pulselessness in 7 (+ 1) minutes, 
and asystole followed 9-18 minutes later. The asystolic 
animals were left undisturbed for 15-31 minutes after 
which heart retrieval was performed and transplanta-
tion was done into recipient animals. All hearts 
returned to sinus rhythm without the use of inotropes. 
Follow-up showed good myocardial function and no 
significant ischemic damage. 
Reanimation is proposed for situations where a deci-
sion is made by patient or family to withdraw life sup-
port with the expectation that the patient will die. This 
process will allow adequate time for unhurried consent, 
as does the Pittsburgh protocol. Under this proposal, 
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however, life support will be discontinued in the Intensive 
Care Unit, and standard cardiac criteria will then be used to 
declare death. After death is declared, the body may be left 
undisturbed at room temperature for 20-30 minutes (or 
longer). Organs may then be retrieved right in the ICU. 
This proposal would allow the patient's family to remain 
with the patient during the dying process and for several 
minutes of personal grieving immediately after death, with-
out being disturbed by the procurement team. 
The objection to this proposal could be raised, as in the 
Pittsburgh protocol, that these donors are not dead because 
they do not have "irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory function" as required by the UDDA. Certainly 
the reanimated hearts function normally and are therefore 
not irreversibly dead. The significant difference, however, 
is that the accepted medical standard for management of an 
individual with prolonged absence of cardiopulmonary 
function is to declare the person dead without resuscitative 
efforts. The Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining 
Treatment and the Care of the Dying published by the Hastings 
Center in 1987 state: "complete cessation of circulation to 
the normothermic adult brain for more than ten minutes is 
incompatible with survival of brain tissue." 
Criteria for the declaration of death prior to retrieval of 
hearts in the reanimation procedure are consistent with 
those proposed by Bernat, Culver, and Gert in 1981.9 These 
authors observe that the UDDA allows two separate and 
equal criteria for death. They contend that conceptually all 
death is brain death, and they propose an alternative statute 
which would read: 
"An individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all 
functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem, is dead. (a) 
In the absence of artificial means of cardiopulmonary support, 
death may be determined by the prolonged absence of spontaneous 
circulatory and respiratory functions. (b) In the presence of arti-
ficial means of cardiopulmonary support, death must be deter-
mined by tests of brain function. In both situations, the determi-
nation of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical 
standards. " 
Although this proposal has greater conceptual clarity 
than the UDDA, the advantage of uniformity among states 
obtained by following the wording of the UDDA outweighs 
the potential advantage of attempting to change. 
Conclusion 
We believe that the proposal for retrieval of solid organs 
from NHBCD's using this reanimation approach offers sev-
eral ethical advantages. First, consent is obtained before 
the protocol is instituted, a major advantage over the in situ 
cold preservation proposal. Second, using the standard def-
inition of death and accepted standards for declaration of 
death offers an advantage over the Pittsburgh protocol. We 
further believe that arranging the retrieval in a manner that 
will allow the family to be with the patient during and after 
death is a compassionate measure which will be appreciat-
ed by families and may lessen the potential impact of such 
a protocol on the general public. 
(continued on page 4) 
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Reanimation of Dead Hearts 
Steven R. Gundry, MD 
The most important factor facing organ transplantation 
in the United States is the shortage of donor organs. With 
the introduction of Cyclosporine and other new anti-rejec-
tion drugs in the 1980's, transplantation of numerous organs 
initially skyrocketed. Unfortunately, organ transplantation 
has plateaued in number since 1990, despite a massive 
increase in waiting lists for patients needing transplanta-
tion. In fact, every year approximately 31,000 patients 
await organ transplantation of some type, yet only about 
15,000 transplants are done per year. This is all the more 
unfortunate since an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 people die 
every year in circumstances that 
these infants alive should not be the issue, but rather 
where to find additional donors. 
There is another set of donors who at present are only 
potential donors. These patients are for the most part neu-
rologically "dead" but do not fully qualify as "brain-dead" 
by standard criteria. They have sustained a major neuro-
logic insult and either have a living will or because of fam-
ily's wishes are allowed to die a compassionate death, usu-
ally by extubating and allowing them to become hypoxic 
and suffer cardiac arrest. Unfortunately, many of these 
patients have perfectly usable organs, particularly heart or 
kidneys, but these organs are not rou-
would allow successful donation 
and transplantation of their 
organs, yet only about 4,500 
patients per year actually 
become organ donors. 
The impact of this shortage 
has been particularly felt here at 
"Some hearts, even after two hours 
of arrest and CPR, can be 
reanimated and support the 
donor circulation." 
tinely used because the patient is 
dead and the organ would be 
assumed to be nonviable. We believe 
the hypothesis that these organs 
would fare poorly is quite frankly 
wrong. We have become convinced 
Lorna Linda with our infant heart transplantation program. 
A few years ago one of our fellows, Mario Chiavarelli, fol-
lowed 111 newborn infants who were registered for heart 
transplantation at Lorna Linda. As is our policy, families 
are given the option of having their infants await transplan-
tation here at our hospital or at another hospital until the 
donor organ becomes available. Of the 58 patients that 
were kept at Lorna Linda, 12% died while awaiting a trans-
plant while 88% were successfully transplanted. In con-
trast to that, of the 53 patients who were kept at other hos-
pitals, only 62% were successfully transplanted while 38% 
died while awaiting. In fact, nationwide, upwards of 30-
40% of infants awaiting transplantation die before a donor 
is identified. While this figure is very disheartening and 
shows the clear problem in organ donation, it also points up 
the superb job the Lorna Linda neonatologists have done 
in keeping these critical infants alive for many months 
while awaiting donor organs. Sadly, the ability to keep 
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of this over the years we have done 
heart transplantation, harvesting hearts from infants, chil-
dren and adults who have had significant periods of cardiac 
arrest and cardiopulmonary resuscitation prior to being har-
vested. Remarkably, some hearts, even after two hours of 
arrest and CPR, can be reanimated and support the donor 
circulation. Unfortunately for the donor during this time 
period, the brain usually becomes hypoxic and is not resus-
citated. These hearts can be harvested and have done 
extremely well as donors. Longterm function of these 
hearts is not any different than donors that have never had 
a cardiac arrest. 
Beginning in 1990, we developed a series of laboratory 
experiments to determine whether or not our hypothesis 
was correct-that hearts from clinically dead patients with-
out a heartbeat (better known as non-heart beating donors) 
could be reanimated and used successfully in other per-
sons. Lambs were used in which lamb donors were anes-
thetized, then paralyzed, and allowed to die a hypoxic 
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death. Usually, it took from eight to twelve minutes to 
obtain cardiac asystole following extubation, and at that 
point the lambs were allowed to lie undisturbed for anoth-
er 30 minutes. Their hearts were then harvested and treat-
I ed with a cold cardioplegia preservative solution. Shortly 
thereafter an additional set of lambs was placed on car-
diopulmonary bypass and were then transplanted with 
these dead hearts. The dead hearts were reperfused using 
reperfusion modifications. Remarkably, all hearts were 
capable of supporting the circulation of these animals with-
out inotropic support or medications to improve heart func-
tion. 
We repeated these experiments in lambs that were 
exsanguinated, simulating trauma patients who hemor-
rhage from an auto accident or knife or gunshot wounds, 
and arrive in the Emergency Room dead. In the same sce-
nario, these hearts, even after being dead for up to 45 min-
utes, could also be completely reanimated when used as a 
donor organ in a second animal. Spurred by our success in 
this area, last year we repeated the hypoxic experiments on 
non-human primates to determine if our observations in a 
lower species of animal could be duplicated in a sub-human 
primate. To our delight, all the primates who were trans-
planted with "dead" donor organs were successfully reani-
mated and all survived, coming off the heart/lung machine 
on no inotropic support and being extubated immediately 
after the operation. 
This important information has given us encouragement 
to proceed with investigations as to how this could be 
applied to human organ donation. There are a large num-
ber of ethical and legal issues that must be surmounted, 
including the legal definition of death as irreversible cessa-
tion of heartbeat. If a heart that has stopped in one person 
who is declared legally dead, is subsequently put into 
another person and begins beating, was the first person 
legally dead? Bioethics must address this question. • 
Steven R. Gundry, MD 
Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery 
Professor, School of Medicine 
Loma Linda University 
Reanimation Dialogue 
The following discussion took place at Loma Linda's Ethics Grand Rounds on January 10, 1996. David Larson, PhD, co-
director of the LL U Center for Christian Bioethics, served as moderator for the questions asked of the two speakers, Robert Orr, 
MD, director of clinical ethics at LL U and Steven Gundry, MD, chief of cardiothoracic surgery at LL U. 
If I understand things correctly, both of you are persuaded that the 
approach being considered at LL U has some ethical and legal 
advantages over approaches now in place elsewhere and that 
reanimation would conform to the Uniform Determination of 
Death Act. Is that a fair summary of what is underwayP 
Gundry and Orr: Yes. 
Would this apply to both conscious and unconscious donorsP 
Gundry: There is no reason why it couldn't be in either, 
depending on the family's and patient's wishes. 
Orr: We would have to be careful to address the needs of 
the person who is dying. As when we now stop the venti-
lator in a person with some degree of consciousness, we 
assure that person, ourselves, and the family that we give 
adequate sedation so that they are unaware of the sensa-
tion of not being able to breathe adequately. 
What does one say to the person who claims that the donor was 
not really dead if it is possible to start up his or her heart in 
another individual's bodyP 
Orr: Even though we declare the time of death by the 
heart stopping, we are waiting a period of time to be sure 
the whole person is dead. The Uniform Determination of 
Death Act says that death must be declared using standard 
clinical criteria. The standard treatment for a person who 
has been down without any circulation for 20 or 30 minutes 
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is nothing, because we know that person is dead. 
What do we say to those who claim that the 20 or 30 minutes of 
down time was orchestrated and had this not been done the person 
would still be aliveP 
Orr: They are absolutely right. We currently orchestrate 
retrieval of organs by brain death criteria because of the 
timing and the sequence and so on. It is very similar. 
You mentioned that DNR orders would have to be reversed. For 
what purposeP 
Orr: Usually the time from getting consent to actually 
retrieving the organs would be more than a few minutes-
hours to perhaps the next day. During that time, if you 
actually wanted to retrieve that heart, you would do every-
thing you could to preserve it. You could negotiate with the 
family. If they decide not to do it you could accept their 
position. But if you are really going to try to retrieve that 
heart, you have to withdraw the DNR order and work hard 
to keep that heart healthy. 
Who is going to educate the families about this new criteria if we 
aren't clear on the present guidelinesP 
Orr: That is a very insightful question and this is a major 
problem. One of the reasons why we have fewer organ 
donors than we might is because there is considerable mis-
conception over the concept of brain death. We are trying 
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to get away from the name "brain death" because it implies 
a different kind of death; death by neurological criteria is a 
better name. We should do a better job of education in that 
area as well. Moving in this direction is going to require 
some major education efforts with staff as well as the pub-
lic so people realize we are really following good, rigid clin-
ical and conceptual criteria. 
There is currently fundingfor research but is there fundingfor this 
kind of educationP Is there any surgical advantage to goingfrom 
20 minutes down to 10 minutesP If there isn't, then it seems like 
there would be a tremendous political advantage to waiting the 
full 20 minutes. 
Orr: We really need to include cost of education in 
research proposals if we are going to be doing something 
clinical that IS innovative. It is a legitimate research 
expense. 
If protocols are being used at other centers, and you feel those pro-
tocols are probably less defensible ethically and legally than those 
being proposed at LL U, what are we waiting forP 
Gundry: The other centers are doing organs with the 
exception of the heart-mostly kidneys and an occasional 
liver. We were ready to attempt reanimation a few years 
ago and again last fall, but the problem with the heart is a 
legal one. Our attorneys tell us that some bright young dis-
trict attorney could use The Uniform Declaration of Death 
Act and say that we took the heart out and proved 
reversible cessation of heart function by reanimating it in 
someone else and therefore are guilty of manslaughter. 
That is not the same as letting someone else die even for 
two minutes and taking out their organs except for their 
heart because their heart is in fact irreversibly dead since 
they didn't bother to use it. So it is this silly law about irre-
versible cessation of heartbeat that is the catch-22, and why 
the other centers can, if you will, "get away with it." 
All hearts that are transplanted, of course, are reanimated if they 
are successful. The real question is, how can we be certain that 
brain death has occurred.? 
Gundry: That's right. But all hearts that are currently har-
vested are from, we assume, brain dead donors. The crite-
ria for brain death are loose from state to state-there is no 
uniform criteria for brain death determination. 
Except that no one would doubt that an individual whose heart 
has been still for twenty minutes has expired, am I correct in thatP 
Gundry: Yes, no one would doubt that except for some 
bright young district attorney who wanted his name in the 
paper. 
There is a point at which the line for optimal time to remove the 
heart and the line that agreement that death has occurred cross 
each other. Dr. Orr has suggested that 10 minutes may be long 
enough. 
Gundry: When we began these experiments we started at 
10 minutes and worked our way up to 45 minutes. There 
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is no difference in how the hearts do. We feel the advan-
tage of this technique is that the donor could be allowed to 
die in the presence of the family; for example, if the donor 
is a child, the family would be able to hold the child and 
have the child die in their arms. The harvest could then 
take place in a fairly non-hurried fashion and this would 
have a tremendous benefit for the family. 
You said that you are up to 45 minutes--is that a final plateau 
or is a longer time still possibleP 
Gundry: Forty-five minutes is the current limit, but not 
the final limit. We are not going to spend the time and 
money to increase the upper time limit until we find out if 
we are going to be allowed to perform this procedure. 
Orr: What I didn't understand clearly until Dr. Gundry's 
presentation today is that retroprofusion is no longer done 
when you retrieve a heart from a brain dead cadaver. So 
that is the new part; is that correct? 
Gundry: We thought that was the key to the procedure, 
but then we eliminated the retroprofusion and it still 
worked. 
You mentioned that you want to keep the person who counsels the 
family about the decision to withdraw life support and the person 
who encourages the family to donate their loved one's organs sep-
arate. How do you plan to do thatP 
Orr: The decisions need to be separate in time. It is the 
sequence that is important. We don't want aggressive 
transplant surgeons approaching a family and pressuring 
them to donate organs. Only after the family decides that 
their loved one is reaching the end of life and life support 
should be withdrawn should the family be approached 
about donation of organs .• 
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James W. Walters Publishes Second Book 
on Ethics and Aging 
By Douglas B. Kasischke 
Earlier this year, James W. Walters, 
Professor of Christian Ethics at Loma 
Linda University, published Choosing Whos 
to Live: Ethics and Aging. This is his second 
book on ethics and aging. It follows close 
on the heels (only three years) of Walter's 
first book on the subject, Facing Limits: 
Ethics and Health Care for the Elderly, which he edited along 
with LLU Faculty of Religion Dean Gerald R. Winslow. 
Both books, which are products of two conferences on 
ethics and aging held in Loma Linda, seek to expand dis-
course on the subject, and respond to arguments forwarded 
by philosopher Daniel Callahan. The earlier project pri-
marily explored different aspects of issues surrounding 
health care for the aged. The latest book, however, is an 
effort less topically diverse, but more self-conscious about 
expanding debate on the subject. 
In 1987 Daniel Callahan's book entitled, Setting Limits: 
Medical Goals in an Aging Society, set the terms for debate 
over health care allocation. He reminded his readers that a 
disproportionate number of people are reaching retirement 
age in a society where medical resources are scarce. In his 
view, this mandates a fundamental shift in thinking on 
what constitutes a life well lived. Elderly people and soci-
ety, Callahan suggested, should accept limits on a normal 
life-span. Death at approximately eighty years of age 
would constitute what he saw as a tolerable death. Thus, 
at around eighty years of age, the elderly would forgo life 
saving treatment (even antibiotics) for the good of society, 
dying shortly thereafter. Medical resources saved would 
then go to benefit younger generations. Through health 
care rationing, a balance could be struck between the com-
peting needs of different generations. 
With Callahan's perspective articulated, the bioethics 
community (among others) clamored to respond. Walters' 
books represent two aspects of this response. Both were 
the offspring of national conferences on health care and 
ethics. The first conference, organized by Walters in 1990 
with the help of a grant from the National Endowment for 
the Humanities, involved a wide range of presenters and 
was geared especially toward the public. From it came 
Facing Limits in 1993. One year later, with money left over 
from the first conference, Walters put on a second event, 
compiled the essays presented at that conference, and pub-
lished Choosing Who s to Live. 
Of the two books, Choosing, like the conference that pre-
ceded it, is the more academic. Its purpose is "to take this 
crucial debate [health care and ethics] beyond Callahan 
,\ into the next round of discussion." Thus, it is a discourse 
between scholars, not between scholars and lay readers. 
However, the book is not without interest to the lay per-
son. The essays are presented in an order which leads the 
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reader along a path to the "next round of discussion." With 
only three sections-"Justifications," "Applications," and 
"Reflections,"-the path is relatively easy to follow. 
For justifications, Walters provides two essays: one by 
Paul T. Menzel and the other by Norman Daniels. While 
both offer various takes on a "prudential" model for health 
care rationing, Menzel offers a helpful opening essay which 
introduces the reader to various aspects of the debate over 
health care rationing. Although much of the rationing 
debate focuses on models that emphasize justice for indi-
viduals or community, answers may be found in posing a 
"prudential consent" model that honors individual choice 
for future care. 
Daniels provides a second perspective on the prudential 
approach described by Menzel. His approach is more 
detailed, and encourages a "prudential lifespan account" 
that incorporates a more cosmopolitan global perspective. 
Though Daniels distinguishes between himself and 
Menzel, and each essay stands on its own, the articles com-
plement each other. Menzel provides an overview of how 
the rationing debate works on a theoretical level, and 
Daniels provides a detailed example of that theory at work. 
In the second section, philosophers Margaret P. Battin 
and Nancy Jecker provide applications, or rather, ways in 
which the health care rationing debate might interact with 
medical practices. Battin discusses euthanasia and possible 
relationships between that and the issue at hand. She 
argues that certain forms of euthanasia might prove moral-
ly useful tools in avoiding health care rationing. However, 
there are insidious kinds of euthanasia, such as those prac-
ticed in Nazi Germany, that health care rationing could 
become. 
One of the dangers in health care rationing is that it may 
divert attention away from other fundamental aspects of 
care for certain groups. Jecker argues that in discussing 
rationing of acute (lifesaving) care for elderly people, we 
are ignoring their more fundamental need for long-term 
care. To her, this suggests a health care establishment 
indifferent to the real needs of the elderly, especially elder-
ly women who predominately rely on long-term care. 
Rationing care for the elderly should not be the issue, but 
we should analyze how resources might be effectively 
directed towards long-term care. 
By presenting apt examples of theoretical and practical 
approaches to issues surrounding ethics and aging Walters 
prepares the reader for the third section of this book. He 
presents two more essays analyzing and critiquing bioethics 
and its approach to aging and ethics. In various ways, both 
attack underlying assumptions permeating discourse on the 
subject. 
The fifth essay is authored by sociologist Carroll Estes 
and two associates. They suggest that attitudes about the 
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elderly and the place of health care in our lives are socially 
constructed realities, informed by "the present social, cul-
tural, political, and economic environment." Our percep-
tion of a crisis in these matters may be socially constructed 
also. Dialogue about the crisis must proceed with awareness 
of the social forces that mold and perhaps even create it. 
John Kilner weighs in with a final article that expands on 
themes in the previous essay. He discusses what he sees as 
the political, economic, and religious factors that inform 
debate on health care, ethics and aging. Through describ-
ing these factors, he demonstrates their existence, implying 
that the claims of Estes and company might actually be 
valid. 
Though Choosing Whos to Live does not demonstrate 
debate on ethics and aging "beyond Callahan," it does give 
a clear indication of where it might, or at least should, head. 
The final essays in the book suggest, for example, that in a 
debate of such magnitude, the fundamental ways in which 
society assigns meaning and value should be examined. In 
his article Kilner asks, "In a country that spends $3 billion 
annually on potato chips why would people consider pre-
venting a certain group of patients from obtaining lifesaving / ... 
health care to be one of the best ways to save money?" 
Perhaps future dialogue on ethics and aging will center on 
how much society should spend on potato chips .• 
Doug Kasischke, Ethics Student, Graduate Assistant 
Loma Linda University 
Center for Christian Bioethics. 
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